Abstract
Introduction
On 6 October 2015, the ECJ handed down its ruling in Post Danmark II 1 (occasionally hereinafter referred to as PD II), and with that provided guidance on how to assess the legality of rebate schemes under EU competition law. The questions sent by the Danish court to the ECJ were aiming at the core of the EU Competition Law rebate abuse doctrine. ECJ was asked to clarify, in light of the old rebate case doctrine, the Commission Guidance Paper 2 from 2009 regarding the application of Art. 102 TFEU, so to enable the Danish court to pin down when to use the so-called as-efficient-competitor test. In general, the Danish court asked how the rebates under Article 102 TFEU should be judged under a more 'economic approach'. More specifically, the Danish Court, inter alia asked: (i) the criteria to be applied in determining whether a rebate scheme is abusive; (ii) the relevance of the as-efficientcompetitor test in determining whether a rebate scheme is abusive; and, (iii) which level of proof is needed to establish an anticompetitive effect. Indeed these are basic questions that should have been answered long ago, given that rebates have been judged under EU
Competition Law since Hofmann-La Roche 3 in 1979.
The ECJ in PD II answered: (i) When the rebate scheme can neither be regarded as a loyalty inducing scheme, nor as a pure quantitative discount, it is necessary to examine all the circumstances of the case, including the criteria and rules governing the grant of the rebates, the extent of the dominant position of the undertaking concerned, and the particular conditions of competition prevailing on the relevant market. The application of the 'asefficient-competitor' test (ii) does not constitute a necessary condition for a finding to the effect that a rebate scheme is abusive under Article 102 TFEU. Indeed, in the case at hand (Post Danmark II), applying the as-efficient-competitor test is of no relevance according to the ECJ. To establish an abuse (iii), the anti-competitive effect of a rebate scheme operated by a dominant undertaking must be probable, however, there is no need to show that the effect is of a serious or appreciable nature.
The former incumbent state-owned post monopolist Post Danmark has provided us with great opportunity to revisit the old case law regarding rebates and selective low pricing, and to see whether these cases have withstood the onslaught of time and the implementation of a more 'economic approach'. In 2012, the ECJ handed down its Post Danmark I (sometimes hereinafter referred to as PD I) judgement regarding selective low pricing, and even though that the low prices discussed were provided through rebates, PD I and PD II have clearly been viewed and judged differently by the ECJ. In this article, PD II is discussed and analysed in light of PD I, as well as other recent cases provided to us by the CJEU. The author concludes that in reference to a conduct that could be described as price discrimination, so-called primary line discrimination and secondary line discrimination, will in light of PD I and PD II be judged differently, one according to the as-efficient-competitor test, while the other will presumably be triggered more easily under case law of older origin.
Background
As all major cases in the EU, Post Danmark I and II have a long pre-history. The business conduct by Post Danmark, in reference to both the addressed and the un-addressed mail distribution service, has been tried by several judicial bodies, and the legal issues in each case
were not as clear cut as one might have thought after reading the ECJ's preliminary rulings. Commercial Court (the Appeal Court), which took the view that given the inconsistency between the old case law regarding rebates and the Commission's Guidance paper regarding the enforcement of Art. 102 TFEU, certain basic questions had to be sent to the ECJ, inter alia:
• The criteria to be applied in determining whether a rebate scheme is abusive, including the relevance of the fact that the rebate scheme applies to the majority of customers on the market.
• The relevance of the as-efficient-competitor test in determining whether a rebate scheme is abusive.
• Whether a finding of abuse requires the anti-competitive effect to be probable and serious or appreciable.
The ECJ judgement in Post Danmark II
14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.
The ECJ started by stating that it is settled case-law that quantity discount linked solely to the volume of purchases from the manufacturer concerned is not, in principle, an abuse. A loyalty rebate on the other hand, which by offering customers financial advantages tends to prevent them from obtaining most or even some of the requirements from competing manufacturers, amounts to an abuse within the meaning of that provision.
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However, according to the ECJ, the rebate system in force by Post Danmark, was neither a quantitative rebate system, nor a clear cut loyalty inducing rebate system. It was not a quantitative system since it was not linked solely to the volume of purchase because the rebates at issue were not granted in respect of each individual order and with that it was not corresponding to the cost savings made by the supplier, but instead based on the basis of the aggregate orders placed over a one year period. As will be discussed below, this statement seem to be somewhat contradictory to the statement made in PD I, where the ECJ in para 30 states that: "…the fact that the practice of a dominant undertaking may, like the pricing policy in issue in the main proceedings, be described as 'price discrimination', that is to say, charging different customers or different classes of customers different prices for goods or services whose costs are the same or, conversely, charging a single price to customers for whom supply costs differ, cannot of itself suggest that there exists an exclusionary abuse."
19 Indeed, at first glance, it seems that in PD I the ECJ required more for price discrimination to be triggered than in PD II. While the difference can be squared by acknowledging that PD I deals with primary line discrimination, i.e. that a dominant firm employ a low price so to exclude a competitor, the statement in PD II deals with In its fuller analysis, the ECJ notes that Post Danmark's rebates were 'retroactive', in the sense that, if the threshold initially set at the beginning of the year in respect of the quantities of mail was exceeded, the rebate rate applied at the end of the year applied to all mailings presented over the reference period, and not only to mailings exceeding the threshold initially estimated. According to the Court that creates a 'suction effect'. That 'suction effect' is further enhanced by the fact that the rebates applied without distinction both to the contestable part of demand and to the non-contestable part of demand.
22 20 The concept of discrimination contains an overlap, as explained by the Commission in BdKEP/Deutsche Post AG188 from 2004, when noting: "The wording [of Article 102] covers three types of discrimination, the first two of them exclusionary and the last one exploitative: (i) the customer of the dominant firm is placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the dominant firm itself; (ii) in relation to other customers of the dominant firm; or (iii) the customer suffers commercially in such a way that its ability to compete in whatever market is impaired. It is obvious that type (i) and (iii) do not require a competitive relationship between the two comparator groups." According to Bergqvist: "[w]hen dealing with discrimination, it is therefore relevant to differentiate b-tween: Exclusionary discrimination, sometimes referred to as primary-line-discrimination, initiated for the purpose of foreclosing competitors by targeting actual or potential customers with selective price reductions or different forms of single branding agreements and Exploitative discrimination, sometimes referred to as secondary-line-discrimination, initiated for the purpose of twisting competition in another market e.g. for the benefit of a subsidiary." Cf. Bergqvist, 'Christian, Where Do We Stand on Discounts? -A Danish Perspective' (November 11, 2015 In addition, the ECJ was not pleased by the length of the reference period, stating it was "relatively long" and making reference to the judgment in Michelin. 23 The Court stated that any system under which discounts are granted according to the quantities sold during a relatively long reference period has the inherent effect that at the end of that period it increases the pressure on the buyer to reach the purchase figure needed to obtain the discount or to avoid suffering the expected loss for the entire period.
The ECJ continued discussing the criteria for being considered an unavoidable trading partner, and rather transparently (implicitly) found that Post Danmark must be considered an unavoidable trading partner at the time. In those circumstances, it is particularly difficult, according to the Court, for competitors of that undertaking to outbid it in the face of discounts based on overall sales volume. ECJ finished by stating that in those circumstances, it must be held that a rebate scheme operated by an undertaking, such as the scheme at issue in the main proceedings, which, without tying customers to that undertaking by a formal obligation, nevertheless tends to make it more difficult for those customers to obtain supplies from competing undertakings, produces an anti-competitive exclusionary effect. 24 In the end, the ECJ took the time to careful indicate, that a dominant undertaking may always provide justification for otherwise proven abusive behaviour.
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Thereafter, the ECJ turned to the as-efficient-competitor test and, to put it mildly, indicated that it is not the only test to be used for establishing whether a rebate scheme is abusive, but that it is one out of several tools that may be used to assess whether there is an abuse. The
Court even admitted that, according to the prevailing EU doctrine, also a not as efficient competitor might contribute to intensifying the competitive pressure on that market, and may still exert constraint on the conduct of the dominant firm. be one and the same thing. If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position is to restrict competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect […] . Lastly, it must be stated that an undertaking in a dominant position has a special responsibility not to impair, by conduct falling outside the scope of competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the common market […] . The grant of payments to customers in consideration of restrictions on the marketing of products equipped with a product of a specific competitor clearly falls outside the scope of competition on the merits. (ii) the second limb is whether the dominant firm is implementing a loyalty rebate scheme that we from previous cases know as an 'exclusive scheme'. To establish whether there is an exclusive scheme, the Court is required to have a quick look at the circumstances of the case, foremost the terms and conditions for the rebate scheme;
(iii) the third or (third A) limb, is whether the dominant firm is employing a scheme that merits a full analysis, taking into consideration all circumstances of the case if it potentially risks to cause loyalty, i.e. it has a fidelity-inducing effect (PD II, Intel, Tomra, and Hoffman La-Roche) . In this group, the dominant firm often has to be an unavoidable trading partner and employ fidelity-inducing rebate scheme, e.g. retroactive rebates with suction effects that has at least 'probable' exclusionary effects. The exclusionary effects may be derived from the fact that the rebate scheme is based on the whole market, i.e. also non-contestable shares of the market;
(iv) the third B (or fourth) limb, which is only relevant if the rebate scheme is not exclusive or has a fidelity-inducing effect, but it is unclear if the quantitative or selective rebate scheme still may cause prices that exclude an "as efficient" competitor (i.e. to exclude/foreclose competition on an economic basis) (see Post Danmark I for price discrimination and the general reference to that the asefficient competitor test may, as one tool of may, be used in these situations in Post Danmark II), and (v) there is also a fourth or fifth limb, the per se legal rebates. These are quantitative rebates where the rebates that are linked solely to the volume of purchases and reflect the lower costs of supply as a result of efficiencies and economies of scale.
Such pure quantity rebates falls, in principle, outside Article 102 TFEU.
Moreover, when customers are entitled to receive the same rebate on the basis of the aggregated purchases over the reference period, the rebate system does not, in principle, result in the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions within the meaning of Article [102] c TFEU.
The Third B, or forth limb, is important. If Post Denmark I should not be considered at least partially overruled, a dominant firm must be able to employ not only a selective low price scheme, but also a selective rebate scheme, which means it would give rebates to a selected few firms so to fend off a competitor under the as-efficient-competitor test, irrespectively of whether the rebate scheme would be applied different vis-à-vis different customers. Indeed, one of the innovative steps taken by the ECJ in Post Danmark I was stipulating that different prices to different customers, i.e. price discrimination, cannot in itself be an exclusionary abuse. Secondly, the ECJ firmly stated that selective pricing above Average Total Cost (ATC)
cannot have anti-competitive effects. This would imply that also dominant firms can compete by lowering prices so to beat competition where competition happen, as long as the asefficient-competitor test is not violated.
In light of Post Danmark I, if Post Danmark in PD II only had employed a short period based rebate scheme for the contested market, would such a rebate have been judged under the asefficient-competitor test, i.e. under the Third B or the fourth limb? This is a quite important question since firms (also dominant firms) compete by responding to competitive pressure.
Also dominant firms should be allowed to decrease prices through rebates in the segments where they face competition, while keeping the price levels intact in other segments. If the dominant firm chooses to do so through a rebate scheme or through a selective pricing scheme, should make no difference. The scheme should not be regarded as fidelity-inducing, nor as price discrimination. , the Commission (and indirectly the court) condemned a pricing structure based on top slice rebates whereby customers got the basic demand, which they would have purchased from the dominant firm at a normal price, but where offered substantial discounts on the extra amounts of which they had a choice of suppliers. The rebate system was held to be a loyalty-inducing rebate system but also in violation of Article 102 [c] TFEU since it was discriminatory, while giving customers different prices. This policy included the grant of special allowances to selected customers. In particular, a special rebate was granted to certain customers established in the border area to Northern
Ireland (the border rebate). The border rebate was unrelated to objective economic factors like the sales volume of the customers. It was used and modulated whenever it was considered that 35 T-57/01, Soda-Solvay, EU:T:2009:519, paras. 28, 189, 203, 214,and 316. 36 Ibid. lower prices when they face competition, be it geographically, e.g. in reference to post services in the major cities, or in certain product segments, e.g. the low quality product segment that is heavily influenced by labour cost. 45 A dominant firm will never face a new entrant that starts with entering every segment of the market. The new entrant will have an incentive to go for the high margin segments, and a dominant firm should be able to lower prices so to compete with the new entrant. This situation would lead to consumer welfare and lower prices. Indeed, if the dominant firm is forced to respond by lowering prices in all segments, prices are likely not going to be lowered in any segment.
Conclusion
For the supporters of an 'as-efficient'-competitor' test under Article 102 TFEU, PD II was a great disappointment. Given the fact that the Danish Court in its line of questions really had tried to pinpoint the Guidance paper, and explore whether the Guidance paper could be regarded as mirroring good law, the ECJ's judgement in PD II cast further doubt on the relevance and utility of the as-efficient-competitor test and thus, generally, the relevance and consistency of the European Commission's Article 102 Enforcement Priorities Guidance less efficient competitor is preferable to no competition and requires the protection of Article 102.
The critique that was given vis-à-vis Intel may thus be recited again. James Venit, for example, stated that "(…) the problem with the Intel judgment is less its novelty than its failure to be novel in the spirit of Post Danmark I.." 46 There does not have to be any analysis of actual effects or consumer harm to determine the anticompetitive effects of discounts conditioned on exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity, even in an ex post case, and there is no de minimis threshold under Article 102. Also, there is no need to establish the existence of a causal link between the discount and the customer's purchasing decision.
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It is worth recalling that, according to rumours, PD II is the case in which the AdvocateGeneral prefaced her opinion by stating that "the Court should not allow itself to be influenced so much by current thinking ("Zeitgeist") or ephemeral trends". This ruling suggests the Court heeded her call and the judgment may yet prove controversial.
Leaving the general discussion behind, I have tried in this article to show that by upholding the case law doctrine for rebates while embracing an as-efficient-competitor test for price discrimination creates friction in the field of price discrimination where primary line discrimination and secondary line discrimination will be judged under very different tests.
Moreover, there is a clear risk that competition will be restricted by the use of the old doctrine under Article 102 (c) TFEU, which Post Danmark II seems to suggest. Hopefully, the ECJ in the Intel appeal may give some guidance on how price discrimination should be judged and 
